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As Israeli forces complete their withdrawal from Lebanon three years 
after the invasion, many Israelis and others are weighing the costs and 
benefits in order to assess what the operation accomplished. One possible 
outcome, and hardly a desirable one from the standpoint of Israeli security, 
would be the replacement of the Palestinian guerrilla infrastructure in 
southern Lebanon with that of the extremist Shiite Muslims even more 
franatically anti-Israeli than the Palestinians. This raises the obvious 
question: did the invasion of Lebanon enhance Israeli security? Two ar-
ticles in this issue cast doubt on that proposition. 
Bruce Hoffman, asserting that the principal objective of the invasion 
was to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon, 
argues that the Israelis only partially succeeded in this mission. The PLO's 
operational capability was temporarily neutralized and its always delicate 
unity undermined, but the invasion did not reduce substantially the number 
of Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israeli or Jewish targets. Jerome 
Slater, who views Israeli objectives in Lebanon as being more wide-ranging 
— including driving the Syrians out, and stabilizing the Maronite Christian 
regime — feels none of these have been attained. Indeed, he believes that 
even the minimal objective of security Israel's northern frontier has failed. 
He argues further that Israel's multiple problems — political, military, 
economic — jeopardize fundamental American interests in the region, and 
that the United States should use the leverage it can exert to enforce a peace 
settlement on Israel. 
With considerable world attention recently focused on the famine in 
Ethiopia, Vincent Khapoya and Baffour Agyeman-Duah offer a timely 
analysis of recent superpower competition for influence in the East African 
region. They conclude that the significant intensification of superpower in-
volvement in this region's conflicts since the mid-1970s will tend to polarize 
the region ideologically, subject it to proxy conflicts, and contribute to the 
diversion of limited resources from economic needs to military re-
quirements. Finally, Colin Mcllheney offers a companion piece to Arthur 
Aughey's study of the politics of the Ulster Protestant paramilitary groups 
(published in the Winter 1985 issue). In this assessment of the military role 
of Protestant paramilitaries, Mcllheney traces the evolution of the move-
ment from its heyday in 1972-74 — when it was deeply involved in sectarian 
violence and politically strong enough to bring about the collapse of the 
power-sharing arrangement — to the present, when only the violent path ap-
pears to offer the opportunity to exercise influence. Mcllheney concludes 
that, "For the Protestant paramilitaries the political road has proved a 
disappointing blind alley." 
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